quotes regarding the selectorate theory

"The incentive to defect from the incumbent to a challenger depends on the prospects of being included in the challenger's winning coalition if he should replace the incumbent." (Bueno De Mesquita et al, 2015:p.10) 

 Winning coalition: “the subset of the selectorate whose support is essential if the incumbent is to remain in power” (Bueno De Mesquita et al, 2015:p.57) 

The selectorate: “within the set of “residents” there is a smaller group who has a formal role in expressing a preference over the selection of the leadership that rules them, though their expression of preference may or may not directly influence the outcome.” (Bueno De Mesquita et al, 2015:p.57) 

 “The measurement of selectorate size and winning coalition size, especially in non-democratic states, is in its infancy. This means the approximations we propose are crude and primitive.” (Bueno De Mesquita et al, 2015: p.211)

valence issue: important issues and it is not ideological. For instance, the integrity of a candidate, economic growth, small businesses. 

Gallagher &Hanson (2015) ARPS argue that Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2005) is not an appropriate model for studying authoritarian politics. 

1) it is difficult to measure the size of "selectorate" and the "winning coalition". 

2) the assumption of people in the selectorate share homogeneous preferences towards public goods and private benefits may not hold. 

3)when there are no formal institutions to structure political transitions, it is difficult to tell if adopting the concept of "selectorate" and "winning coalition" helps.  因為selectorate and winning coalition 是一群可以決定哪位獨裁者上任、維持權力的人，但如果沒有正式制度來界定這群人是誰，那其組成可能是非常不固定的(fluid)。特別是，在威權國家中，領導人的承繼通常都是經過政變、宮變、暗殺、外國扶植而來的，那就表示現行的winning coalition的制度不可行或不被採用。-->In the authoritarian context, however, the situation is much less clear. Autocrats rule in a condition of uncertainty with myriad threats, real or imagined, from multiple actors. Different actors wield different degrees of influence and possess qualitatively different kinds of power.

如同下面引文所說的，selectorates 可以透過很多種方式進行私下的選擇

“Election is thus a clearly delimited public act, defined procedurally by voting, while selection is a vaguer form of private choice that may be carried out by a variety of procedures” (Heclo 1973, p. 21). 

Summary of Bueno De Mesquita et al (2015) by Gallagher &Hanson (2015)

1) it assumes that the members of the selectorate are interchangeable in the sense that all have equal power to form a winning coalition and share identical preferences with respect to public and private goods. 

2) the cost of delivering private goods is assumed to be proportional to the size of the winning coalition. Rulers thus find private goods the least costly way to buy the support of small coalitions, but private goods become expensive relative to public goods as W increases, and rulers shift their allocation of goods accordingly. 

3) they assume that the unenfranchised (沒有選擇權/投票權) do not enter into the ruler's survival calculations, so rulers need not worry about the threat of rebellion.

4) The worst outcome for society (but the best situation for the leader) is when the winning coalition is small and the selectorate is large. In this scenario, the members of the winning coalition are easily replaced and heavily dependent on the survival of the ruler in order to maintain a privileged access to private goods. Their loyalty to the ruler is thus high, and rulers care little about public goods provision. -->leaders who rely on a narrow base of support should be motivated to pursue bad policies, buying off a small group of supporters with private benefits while depriving the larger population of needed public goods, such as infrastructure, education, and rule of law. In systems with small W and large S, these supporters will be insecure about their prospects under a challenger, thus ensuring that a bad ruler can stay in power for a long time.

By contrast, when W is large relative to S, members of the current ruling coalition are much more likely to become part of a new ruler's coalition. Loyalty to the ruler is much weaker, and the selection process is much more competitive. Rulers are thus induced to spend more resources to maintain their coalition.

BDM’s definition

1)      Core public goods: civil liberties and political rights

2)      Other goods (ch4): public health (p.297-301), education

3)      Private goods: black market exchange rate premiums (1961-1988), corruption, and construction (the sum number of residential, non-residential, and other construction as a percentage of per capita capital stock in 1985 international prices) 

Reference:

Bueno De Mesquita, B., A. Smith, J. D. Morrow, and R. M. Siverson. 2005. The logic of political survival. MIT press.

-->Bueno De Mesquita et al. (2005) said they prefer their model called the winning coalition model, but more scholars use the selectorate model, so Bueno De Mesquita et al. later adopt this change of term. 

Gallagher, M. E., & Hanson, J. K. 2015. Power tool or dull blade? Selectorate theory for autocracies. Annual Review of Political Science, 18, 367-385.

Heclo H. 1973. Presidential and prime ministerial selection. In Perspectives on Presidential Selection, ed. DR Matthews, pp. 19–48. Washington, DC: Brookings Inst.